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The SEC and the Securities Bar: Adversaries or Allies?
Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event.'
The wisdom of two distinguished law firms before the event is presently being
questioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in its com-
plaint against National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC),2 which The
Wall Street Journal3 has recently categorized as "the best-read document
since 'Gone With the Wind'." The issue which has created this great agita-
tion is the SEC's contention that:
When an attorney permits his name to be used either in a regis-
tration statement or in any other document associated with a se-
curities transaction, and such attorney's opinion or other partici-
pation will have the effect of inducing third parties to rely upon
that attorney's participation as to the validity of a transaction or
the occurrence of an event, the attorney's responsibilities cease to
be solely to his client and run to these third parties, of which
the SEC may be one, if the attorney's representations are con-
tained in a document filed with such agency. 4
The SEC has named twenty individual, corporate and partnership de-
fendants in its complaint alleging the perpetration of fraud in the
securities market. The complaint charges violations of § 17(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 19335 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,6
1. Quoted by Bramwell, B. in Cornman v. The Eastern Counties Ry. Co., 5 Jur.
(N.S.) 657, 658 (1859).
2. Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Complaint]. The text of the Complaint may also be found in (1971-1972 Transfer
Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,360 (1972).
3. Green, A Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable To Public Stuns, Angers Firms,
Feb. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
4. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1972, at 3, col. 5.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) and Rule lob-5 thereunder, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5
(1973). Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
The SEC is restricted to seeking injunctive relief as to those acts or practices alleged
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both of which prohibit the use of false or misleading statements in the sales
or purchase of securities. The complaint also alleges violations of §§
13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 which prohibit
the use of false or misleading statements in the solicitation of proxies and
require the filing of accurate reports with the SEC when required.
The corporate defendants have accepted a consent decree which enjoins
NSMC, its officers, and agents from committing any of the acts enumerated
in the SEC complaint and orders them to file amended reports as required by
§ 13(a) for the period in question.8 However, the other defendants includ-
ing White & Case, a prominent New York law firm; Lord, Bissel & Brook,
a well known Chicago law firm; Robert A. Katz, 9 a sole practitioner in
New York City at the time of the alleged violations; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., a prestigious national accounting firm; and certain individual mem-
bers of these partnerships have decided to contest the SEC's action. As
of August 9, 1973, all defendants have answered the complaint and are
awaiting a decision by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on a
mutual schedule of discovery.1"
I. The SEC Complaint
The SEC is seeking to enjoin the defendant attorneys and accountants from
any further violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act and
to violate the law or commission rules. However, a private right of action has been
found to exist under § 10(b). In fact, White & Case and Lord, Bissell & Brook, among
others, have already been named in a civil action on the SEC's complaint in the NSMC
case. Natale v. National Student Marketing Corporation, Civil Action No. 721-72
(S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 18, 1972).
If fraud or other willful law violation is indicated, the SEC may refer the facts to
the Department of Justice with a recommendation for criminal prosecution of the
offending persons. That Department, through its local United States Attorneys, may
present the evidence to a federal grand jury and seek an indictment.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a) and 78n(a) (1970) and rules and regulations thereunder.
8. Judgment of Permanent Injunction, SEC v. National Student Marketing Cor-
poration, Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., July 26, 1972).
9. Defendant Katz is named in the fourth claim of the complaint. Mr. Katz rep-
resented the purchasers of Compujob, Inc., and prepared and/or drafted the documents
in connection with the acquisition of Compujob by his clients from NSMC. The SEC
charges that Katz issued a legal opinion to the effect that the Compujob sale was
completed and the income from the sale could be properly included in NSMC's finan-
cial statements for its fiscal year ending August 31, 1969. The SEC alleges that the
sale was not completed, and therefore the income could not properly be included.
Thus, Katz contributed to the false and misleading statements which are at issue in
this case. However, since Katz was not directly involved in the merger, his role will
not be discussed in this article.
10. On March 7, 1973, the court denied a motion of Lord, Bissell & Brook to
dismiss the amended complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. It also
denied motions of defendants White & Case and partner Marion Jay Epley to dismiss
the amended complaint or alternatively to sever and transfer those claims against
them to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
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the Exchange Act in connection with the purchase or sale of NSMC stock, or
that of any other issuer. It also requests an injunction against White &
Case and its partner, Marion Jay Epley, against violation of § 13(a) of the
Exchange Act by filing of false and misleading annual reports and other
documents. Further, it seeks to enjoin them from issuing and disseminating
proxy material for meetings of NSMC or any other person which does not
comply with § 14(a) of the Exchange Act. An injunction of this type could
have dire consequences for these defendant attorneys in the future, since
it could transform an erroneous opinion of White & Case given in some fu-
ture securities transaction into contempt of court." Moreover, under Rule
2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 12 the entry of such an injunction could
result, without any hearing, in their being suspended from future appear-
ances or practices before the Commission.
The complaint generally is based upon the alleged issuance of false fi-
nancial reports by NSMC. The specific allegations against the defendant
attorneys and accountants, found in the second claim"s of the complaint,
may be summarized as follows: (a) that at the closing of the merger be-
tween NSMC and Interstate National Corporation (Interstate) in New York
City on October 31, 1969, the attorneys (White & Case for NSMC, and Lord,
Bissel & Brook for Interstate) failed to refuse to issue a legal opinion that
all steps taken by NSMC to consummate the merger of Interstate with
NSMC had been validly taken and that, to the knowledge of counsel,
NSMC had incurred no violation of federal or state law; (b) that they failed
to insist that NSMC's financial statements be revised and shareholders be
resolicited with respect to the Interstate-NSMC merger; (c) that, having
failed to insist on such revision and resolicitation, they failed to cease repre-
senting their clients; (d) they failed to notify the plaintiff Commission con-
cerning the allegedly misleading nature of certain unaudited nine-month fi-
nancial statements of their client NSMC; and (e) they transmitted a report
on behalf of their client to the SEC which concealed certain information
which defendant Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., had sent in a "comfort
letter."
11. Rule 10b-5 Comes of Age
Since the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, a considerable
body of federal corporation law has developed. 1 4 This is especially true of
11. Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Law Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAw. 1153, 1155 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Karmell.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1973).
13. Complaint at para. 48.
14. W. CARY, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS, 594 (4th ed. abr. 1970).
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Rule lOb-5. "The courts have used Rule 1Ob-5 to expand the range of li-
ability in the realm of securities transactions, thereby creating a Federal
common law which is in a state of flux."'15 The question presented by the
NSMC case is whether corporate attorneys under these circumstances
may be included in this range of liability. Although § 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated there-
under state that they may be invoked against "any person" who indulges in
fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
in actual practice defendants in § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases have tended
to fall into four general categories:' (a) insiders (those persons who, be-
cause of their position have access to the facts not available to the gen-
eral public and use this information for their personal benefit); (b) broker-
dealers; (c) corporations whose stock is purchased or sold by plaintiffs;
and (d) those who "aid and abet" or conspire with a party who falls into
one of the first three categories. In the instant case, defendant corporate
attorneys would have to come under the last classification. 1"
Although injunction proceedings against attorneys for Rule lOb-5 viola-
tions are a recent phenomenon and there is little precedent to follow, the
allegations under the circumstances of this case do not seem unfounded.
Numerous courts and the SEC have taken the position that accountants may
be held liable to third parties as a result of 10b-5 violations.' 8 Further-
15. Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
16. Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Pettit v.
American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), where a charge against
the American Stock Exchange of aiding and abetting the illegal distribution of stock
by failing to take disciplinary action against "abusive conduct and practices priorities"
which the agency knew or should have known was held sufficient to sustain a com-
plaint.
17. The precise definition of an "aider and abettor" is not clear. In SEC v. Na-
tional Bankers Life Insurance Co., 324 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex., 1971), ajI'd mem.,
448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971), the court noted that, with respect to fraudulent conduct
in violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act and Rule lOb-5, "aiding and abetting" is
an elusive concept, but that "it is clear that the defendant must have some knowledge
of the fraudulent act or scheme he is aiding, though that knowledge may be actual or
constructive." 324 F. Supp. at 195.
In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 682
(N.D. Ind. 1966), afj'd 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970), the court noted that "there are circumstances under which a person or a
corporation may give the requisite assistance or encouragement to a wrongdoer so as
to constitute an aiding or abetting by merely failing to take action." 259 F. Supp.
at 682. But cf. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971), "We find nothing
in Rule lOb-5 that purports to impose liability on anyone whose conduct consists
solely of inaction." For a more thorough discussion of the aider and abetter theory
in relation to the NSMC case, see 48 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 661, 664-666 (1973).
18. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), and Brief for
SEC as Amicus Curiae, Fischer v. Kletz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,844 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); H.L. Green Co., Inc. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); In re
Touche, Niven, Bailey and Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-671 (1957); Consent Injunction
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more, as previously stated, both the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 1Ob-5 include
"any person" who indulges in fraudulent practices "in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities."'19
Thus, there does not seem to be much reason why an attorney who has
made an untrue statement in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security should not be found guilty of a Rule 10b-5 violation. As the court
reasoned in SEC v. Frank,20 "[A] lawyer, no more than others, can es-
cape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw and could readily
understand." In fact, the recent trend of securities law has been that an
attorney should be held to a higher standard of due care in securities trans-
actions. In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,21 an individual attorney-
director, among others, was found liable for violation of § 11 of the 1933
Act. In determining whether the attorney involved had made a reasonable
investigation before attaching his name to a registration statement, the court
reasoned that since his law firm was Counsel for BarChris in matters per-
taining to the registration of securities, and he had personally drafted the
registration statement for the debentures, more was required of him in the
way of reasonable investigation as a result of his unique position. Moreover,
in a situation reasonably similar to that in the NSMC case, the court rea-
soned that "instead of simply relying on the assurances of his client that
there had been no adverse changes in the company's financial position, he
should have checked for himself those matters which were easily verifi-
able." 22
III. Attorneys as Policemen
The most interesting and undoubtedly the most surprising aspect of the
SEC's complaint is the allegation that, under the circumstances, the attor-
neys had the duty to notify the SEC of the irregularities. Although, as pre-
viously noted, the attorneys could be guilty of a lob-5 violation by sim-
ply issuing a false statement in connection with the purchase or sale of secur-
in SEC v. Pig 'N Whistle Corp., Civil Action No. 545-71 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 14, 1972);
In Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court, 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27 (1967), the court held
that, in a good faith derivative suit initiated by stockholders, the statutory privilege for
communication between a certified public accountant and his corporate client did not
protect the corporation from being required to disclose such communications to the
stockholders. The Colorado court relied upon the analogy of the joint attorney ex-
ception and pointed out that employment of certified public accountants by the cor-
poration was for the benefit of all the stockholders.
19. Supra note 6 (emphasis added).
20. 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a more thorough discussion of the
BarChris case in relation to the National Student Marketing case, see 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 153 (1972).
22. 283 F. Supp. at 692.
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ities, the SEC's further allegations seem to be more of a guide for other se-
curities lawyers who may find themselves in similar situations. The com-
plaint seems to suggest the various alternatives the SEC believed the attor-
neys then had. Presumably these alternatives, if acted upon, could have re-
duced the seriousness of their participation in the alleged fraudulent
scheme in varying degrees. The SEC contends that once the defendants had
given their opinion, they could have either convinced the corporation to re-
solicit the proxies or withdrawn from the case and informed the SEC of their
withdrawal.
Probably the most controversial aspect of this case is the interpreta-
tion of the SEC's allegation calling for an attorney to be a "policeman" in-
stead of an advocate, thus jeopardizing the confidential attorney-client re-
lationship.23  This is undoubtedly an overly-broad interpretation of the
SEC's position, for a careful reading of the complaint will show that it is
only under the particular circumstances of this case, that the SEC asserts
this novel obligation.
IV. Circumstances Under Which the Alleged Violation Occurred
A brief history of the events leading up to the closing of the merger is neces-
sary in order for one to clearly appreciate the basis of the SEC's allega-
tion. Included in the merger agreement, which constituted part of the
proxy material sent to shareholders of both corporations in order to gain
approval of the merger, was the condition that the three partnership defend-
ants were to scrutinize the agreement and to submit opinions on it. One con-
sequence of this was that the shareholders could rely on these opinions as to
the validity of the merger. As the SEC stated,
Presumably, these conditions were for the protection of the
shareholders and were intended to assure them that the integrity
of the merger would be protected by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
as accountants, and Lord, Bissell & Brook and White & Case, as
counsel-all of whom were cited by name in the Agreement as
being responsible for fulfilling these conditions. 24
According to the merger agreement, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. was to
submit a "comfort letter" which would assure that on the basis of a limited
23. Supra note 2.
24. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Opposition to the
Motion of Defendants Lord, Bissell & Brook, Max E. Meyer, Louis F. Schauer and
Cameron Brown to Dismiss the Complaint for Failure to State A Claim Upon Which
Relief Can Be Granted or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and In Opposi-
tion to the Motion of Defendants Paul E. Allison, William J. Bache and Robert P.
Tate for Summary Judgment. Civil Action 225-72, p. 6 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Memol.
1973]
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review, but not an audit, they had no reason to believe that any material
adjustments of the unaudited interim financial statements sent in the proxy
material would be required.25 This letter was to include the period from
May 31, 1969 to a specified date not more than five business days prior to
the effective date of the merger. White & Case was to issue a favorable
opinion that, among other things, all actions and proceedings required by
law to be taken by NSMC in connection with this agreement had been duly
and validly taken. 26 Lord, Bissel & Brook was to do the same regarding
Interstate.27 The closing of the merger occurred on October 31, 1969, when
the legal opinion was issued. However, the SEC alleges that on the same
day, but before the legal opinion was issued, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
dictated their findings over the telephone to the assembled representatives
of NSMC and Interstate. Their eagerly awaited comfort letter turned out to
be of little comfort in that it stated that the financial statements should be
adjusted. As the SEC said,
In sum the "comfort letter" stated that in order to get a fair pic-
ture of the results of NSMC's operations for the nine months ended
May 31, 1969, income should be reduced by $884,000. Since the
company publicly and in the proxy statement has reported
earnings of $702,000, a reduction of income by $884,000 meant
that NSMC should have reported a loss rather than a profit. 28
Thus, in order for the shareholders to have been aware of NSMC's true
financial status, all proxies should have been resolicited. Indeed, after the
closing, in its formal letter, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. suggested that
the companies should consider submitting corrected interim unaudited fi-
nancial information to the shareholders prior to proceeding with the clos-
ing.29  This would have been a costly and time-consuming process. More-
over, if Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.'s estimate of a net loss was correct,
there would always be the possibility that shareholder approval would not
be readily forthcoming. 0 The SEC alleged that the attorneys should have
25. Agreement and Plan of Merger between National Student Marketing Corpora-
tion and Interstate National Corporation dated as of Aug. 13, 1969, and included as
Schedule C to the NSMC proxy material filed with the SEC on Oct. 6, 1969, para.
9(e).
26. Id. at para. 9(a)(IX).
27. Id. at para. 8(a)(X).
28. SEC Memo at 8.
29. Complaint at para. 48(c).
30. According to the Affidavit of Cameron Brown, President of Interstate at the
time of closing, consideration was given to resoliciting shareholders with correct finan-
cial information, but this idea was rejected (SEC exh. 5 page 41, Brown Aff. par. 25).
Two factors which the SEC thinks influenced the decision not to resolicit proxies
are discussed in the SEC Memo:
1) White, Weld & Co. was retained by Interstate to act as investment advisors and
evaluate the merger. They had stated in their report that among the principal causes
[Vol. 23:122
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insisted upon a resolicitation. For the moment let us assume they did, and
the corporation refused. What should the attorneys have done? The SEC
would have them withdraw from the case and inform the SEC of the alleged
irregulatrities. They would require the same of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co. Thus, a question of professional responsibility arises: Are the attor-
neys and accountants responsible to their clients, the corporate entity and
its management, or to the shareholders who voted the merger and the rest
of the investing public?3 1
Under the circumstances of this case a strong argument can be made that
the attorney's responsibility lies with the shareholders of both corporations
and the rest of the investing public. First of all, one could argue that the
communication involved, the comfort letter, was not a confidential docu-
ment. Secondly, there is a strong possibility that even if it were confiden-
tial, the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is applicable.
A. The Communication is not Confidential
The SEC did not order the revelation of a privileged lawyer-client communi-
cation, but rather suggested that the attorneys should have revealed to the
they could foresee for a possible price drop of 20 percent or greater in NSMC's stock
was a significant adverse development such as the cancellation of an announced
merger, or some incident impeaching the credibility of management (failing to achieve
an earnings forecast). Id. at 10; and
2) Immediately following the closing, other officers and directors of Interstate
and its subsidiaries sold approximately $1,900,000 in NSMC stock which they had
obtained in the merger. Yet, "no one sought to advise the open market purchasers
of NSMC's shares that the most recently published financial statements of NSMC
were materially in error and that in fact with the PMM adjustments NSMC had
sustained a loss. Such a revelation could have caused a major price drop in the
stock, as White, Weld & Co., had advised." Id. at 12.
It should be further noted that the price of NSMC stock went from an all time
high of $72.00 a share on December 15, 1967 to $1.00 a share at the time of the filing
of the complaint. Id. at 14-15.
SEC Rule 14a-9 deals with False or Misleading Proxy Statements. It states in part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means
of any proxy statement . which omits to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading
or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with re-
spect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter
which has become false or misleading.
31. An interesting example of a similar dilemma is found in the recent case of
Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971). There the defendant corporation attempted to invoke the attorney-client priv-
ilege in a shareholder derivative suit. The court of appeals rejected the district court's
reasoning that the privilege was invalid in a shareholder derivative suit and reasoned:
But where the corporation is in a suit against its stockholders on charges of
acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well
as those of the corporation and of the public require that the availability of
the privilege be subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause why it
should not be invoked in the particular instance. Id. at 1103-1104,
1973]
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Commission the contents of the "comfort letter" sent by Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. This letter, by its nature, was public information since
its purpose was to assure the stockholders that material adjustments of the
unaudited interim financial statements were not required. Therefore, having
given their approval of a merger relying upon the receipt of a comfort let-
ter, it can be said that the shareholders had a right to know that the merger
took place in spite of the fact that the comfort letter did not meet the re-
quirements of the merger.
The defendants in this case view their legal opinion and the comfort let-
ter in an entirely different light. In their answer to the SEC's complaint,
White & Case and Mr. Epley alleged that the comfort letter "was a waivable
condition precedent to Interstate National Corporation's obligation to con-
summate the merger, but was not a condition . . . to proceed with the
merger."'32  They argue that the representatives of Interstate were justified in
closing the merger in spite of the letter because "[The] question of whether to
proceed with the closing or not was for the representatives of Interstate to
make as a matter of business judgment as to the best interests of Interstate and
its stockholders. '3 3 Presumably they decided to go ahead in spite of the al-
leged mistake in earnings because the adjustments "would only reduce earn-
ings by a few cents per share for the fiscal year ended August 31, 1969. ' '34
The SEC's probable response to this argument can be found in its answer
to Lord, Bissell & Brook's Motion to Dismiss, where it addressed the
"waivable" aspects of these conditions:
If defendants mean to imply that receipt of the comfort letter
was waived by the Interstate Board, then they should show a de-
cision of the Board qua Board to make such a waiver. This may
prove a difficult task in the light of the position of Bach, Allison
and Tate, discussed supra. [Bach, Allison, and Tate, directors of
Interstate, claimed that they were not even aware of the letter or
of its contents on the day of the closing or thereafter, until the fol-
lowing week when they received the final version of the letter from
PMM in the mail.] Furthermore, under § 29(a) of the Ex-
change Act, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a), the requirement that statements
made in connection with the purchase or sale of securities not
be misleading, cannot be waived.35
It appears that whether the conditions were waivable and by whom is
not the important point here for the statute speaks of "misleading infor-
mation." The issue could be more appropriately framed by asking whether
32. Answer of Defendants White & Case and Marion Jay Epley to the first
amended complaint. Civil Action No. 225-72 (D.D.C., filed Mar. 27, 1973).
33. Id. at par. 33.
34. SEC Memo at 9.
35. Id. at 31, n.37.
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defendants misled the shareholders by saying in one part of the proxy state-
ment that a reputable law firm would pass upon the validity of the merger,
as a condition to the merger, and saying in another portion of the proxy
statement that this legal opinion could be waived. Had the shareholders
realized that the condition could be waived, there would be no reason why
defendants would have had to bring to their attention the fact that the com-
fort letter, as described, was never really received. On the other hand, if
the shareholders believed that the receipt of a comfort letter was in fact a
condition to the closing, it would be extremely difficult for defendants to
argue that it was in fact confidential information which they could not show
to either the shareholders or the SEC. The question for the court to deter-
mine will be whether the description of the comfort letter as a waivable
condition to the closing of the merger was misleading.
B. Even if the Communication is Confidential the Crime-Fraud Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege is Applicable
If the comfort letter was misleading, there is yet another reason why the
attorneys' duty lies with the shareholders and the investing public. There
has always been a "crime-fraud" exception to the lawyer-client privilege.
"Communications made by a client to his attorney during or before the com-
mission of a crime or fraud and for the purpose of being guided or as-
sisted in such commission are not privileged." 36
Recent articles in BUSINESS LAWYER 37 and the TEXAS LAW REVIEW 38
have examined the NSMC case in light of past actions involving securities vio-
lations by attorneys. Both conclude that the "crime-fraud exception" is not
applicable under these circumstances because neither of the following re-
quisites for this exception can be found:
36. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum). Al
least one famous case states the exception even more broadly, extending it to com-
munications with a lawyer in furtherance of "the purpose of committing a crime or
tort." United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D.
Mass. 1950). See also DR 7-102(B)(1) Code of Professional Responsibility (Adopted
by the American Bar Association on Aug. 12, 1969):
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that his client has, in
the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client re-
fuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal.
DR 4- 101(C)(2) and (3) state:
A lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary
Rules or required by law or court order. [He may also] reveal the intention
of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime.
37. Supra note 11.
38. 50 TEx. L. REV. 1265 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Texas Note].
1973]
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Where such documents contain false or misleading information,
an attorney's liability for such fraud, where an attorney is acting
solely as agent for a client, must necessarily depend upon either
actual knowledge of the fraudulent statements, or, absent such
knowledge, a duty to discover the fraud.39
Thus, since the crime-fraud exception does not apply, the authors argue
that defendant attorneys had a higher duty to their client.
Hopefully, the legitimate public interest in preserving the confi-
dential relationship between attorney and client will be regarded
as more important than the SEC's apparent intention of enlisting the
aid of private practitioners to implement enforcement of the se-
curities laws.40
Using both of these viewpoints to examine the applicability of the crime-
fraud exception, it can be shown why their respective authors have not
given enough weight to certain facts which make the SEC's complaint much
stronger than they presume.
The first question to consider is whether the attorneys had actual knowl-
edge of the fraud. Ms. Karmel seems to argue that the attorneys did not
have actual knowledge of the fraud because it took place when the proxies
were solicited. She cites ABA opinion 314 for the proposition that "[t]he
difficult problem arises when the client has in fact misled but without the
lawyer's knowledge or participation. In that situation, upon discovery of the
misrepresentation, the lawyer must advise the client to correct the state-
ment; if the client refuses, the lawyer's obligation depends on all the cir-
cumstances."'41 She further notes that "[t]he complained-of soliciting material
was disseminated prior to the time PMM or the defendant law firms were
aware of possible problems in the presentation of the May 31, 1969 finan-
cials."'42 This may be true, but it is irrelevant to the violation alleged. The
SEC is not alleging any wrongdoing by the attorneys in the solicitation of
proxies, for it is true that at that time they had no knowledge or any way of
obtaining knowledge as to the validity of the financials. 43 Rather, the SEC
alleges that the fraud occurred when the defendant attorneys supplied the
"favorable opinion" necessary to close the merger, although they had been
39. Karmel at 1156. Texas Note at 1269-72.
40. Karmel at 1164.
41. Id. at 1161.
42. Id. at 1162.
43. If in fact the financial statements were untrue then the corporation would have
committed a violation of § 14 and Rule 14a-9 when the proxy statements were sent
out. On the other hand, since Rule lob-5 requires that misleading statements be made
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," the attorney's violation
would not occur until Interstate shareholders exchanged their shares of stock for
NSMC shares. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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told in plain language by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. that the approval of
the merger was based on false financial statements. 44 If this language was not
clear enough, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. allegedly later stated in their
"comfort letter" that Interstate and NSMC should consider submitting cor-
rected interim unaudited financials to stockholders prior to proceeding
with the closing.45 Thus, although the "comfort letter" was supposed to be a
requirement for closing,46 the attorneys went ahead and issued a "favor-
able opinion" on the closing when,
in short, the comfort letter told those who saw it that the fig-
ures on which the Interstate (and NSMC) shareholders had given
their approval for the merger were materially false and mislead-
ing. Yet, no disclosure of the adjustments required by the com-
fort letter was made to the Interstate shareholders (or the NSMC
shareholders) specifically or to the investing public generally until
the filing of the instant complaint by the Commission.47
Assuming that even these actions do not constitute actual knowledge of a
fraud, an examination of the second proposed requirement is necessary.
Based upon the information they had available to them, did the attorneys
have a duty to discover the alleged fraud before they issued their opinion?
The Texas article states, "[I]n the instant case, the accountant's last-minute
discovery demanded a rapid judgment on a complex question-the legality
of the NSMC merger."' 48 Although the closing had been scheduled for Octo-
ber 31, 1969, the agreement did not require that the merger be consummated
for almost one full month, until November 28, 1969.49  Therefore the at-
torneys had almost a month to determine whether the Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. allegations were correct, but they did not do so.50 Although
there seems to be little precedent concerning the duties of attorneys to verify
information given them by their clients, SEC v. Frank5' seems relevant in
that it deals with the most extreme position:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement
with regard to securities which he knows to be false simply because
his client has furnished it to him. At the other extreme it would
44. Complaint at para. 39(b).
45. Id. at para. 48(c).
46. Supra note 25.
47. SEC Memo at 9.
48. Texas Note at 1272.
49. Supra note 25, at paras. 9(j) and 8(k).
50. One thing the defendants could have done under these circumstances was to
seek advice from the SEC. Although they had four weeks in which to do so, defend-
ants did not approach the Commission for advice. A request for an opinion from the
Commission or its staff is a well-recognized mitigating circumstance. SEC v. Torr,
87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1937), SEC v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
51. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
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be unreasonable to hold a lawyer who was putting his client's
description of a chemical process into understandable English to
be guilty of fraud simply because of his failure to detect dis-
crepancies between their description and technical reports avail-
able to him in a physical sense but beyond his ability to under-
stand.5 2
There seems little doubt that the same could be true of a corporation's fi-
nancial statements, if the attorney had no reason to suspect them. Yet the
court held in Frank that although the attorney was not an expert within the
meaning of § 11 of the Securities Act, he failed to establish his due dili-
gence defenses because there were too many instances where he failed to
make inquiries which he could easily have made and which, if pursued,
would have put him on his guard.55  Ms. Karmel would distinguish Frank in
that "[t]he court in the Frank case viewed the defendant as an insider
who played more of a role than is customarily played by outside counsel."'54
While it is true that the attorneys in this instance were purely outside coun-
sel, it could be argued that they went beyond their role of advising clients
in that they actually participated in the alleged scheme by allowing their
prestigious names to be used to assure the stockholders that this complex
merger agreement was lawful. Further, although they were not insiders
in the strict sense of the word, given the statements made to them by
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., they had as much reason to be on guard as
would an insider.
Ms. Karmel further argues that the SEC is wrong in likening the functions
of a securities lawyer to that of an independent certified accountant. She
reasons that "[an attorney's opinion is not based upon the same type of in-
dependent investigation as is an accountant's certificate, and it is therefore
a different and more limited imprimatur."55  She relies on the following
language from an SEC decision in the American Finance Co. case:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the
client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant enters into a
personal relationship in which his principal concern is with the in-
terests and rights of his client. The requirement of the Act of
certification by an independent accountant, on the other hand, is
intended to secure for the benefit of public investors the detached
objectivity of a disinterested person. 56
If this is the case, if the attorney's principal concern is with the interests
and rights of his client, one can only wonder why it was necessary to make
52. Id. at 489.
53. Id. at 489-92.
54. Karmel at 1159.
55. Id. at 1163.
56. 40 S.E.C. 1043, 1049 (1962).
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the attorney's favorable opinion a part of the merger agreement in the first
place. It is not required by the SEC Rules and Regulations and, as the de-
fendants allege in their answer, it could be waived by both corporations
if they so desired. Presumably, the SEC believes that the corporation was in
fact using the "favorable opinion" as it would an accountant's certifica-
tion, that is, to secure for the benefit of its shareholders the opinion of a
reputable law firm in order to ease the shareholders' minds as to the le-
gal implications of the planned merger. The point being that when law
firms begin assuming the role of a certified public accountant, they should
be willing to accept the inherent responsibilities.
Finally, it would seem that if the facts are as alleged, an $884,000 error
in the financial statement upon which approval for the merger was secured
should have put the attorneys on guard whether they were insiders,
experts, purely outside counsel or a law firm assuming the role of a certified
public accountant.
In the BarChris case the Court stated in dicta:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of his
client and that to require him to verify their accuracy would set an
unreasonably high standard. This is too broad a generalization. It
is all a matter of degree. To require an audit would obviously
be unreasonable. On the other hand, to require a check of mat-
ters easily verifiable is not unreasonable. Even honest clients can
make mistakes. The statute imposes liability for untrue state-
ments regardless of whether they are intentionally untrue.57
V. Conclusion
The NSMC case is shaping up as a classic confrontation between the SEC
and the securities bar where professional responsibility is to be measured
against the well-established attorney-client privilege. The SEC has set forth
a heretofore unannounced position on the duties and obligations of securi-
ties lawyers, which would appear to significantly expand their liabilities.
But they are not making policemen out of lawyers, for the issue is not, as
the Texas article states, an attempt to make "lawyers-in the limited role of
counsel-. . . accountable with their clients for violations normally attrib-
uted to the clients alone."'5 8 Nor is it as Ms. Karmel sees it, an action charg-
ing illegal conduct by the defendants qua attorneys."9 Rather it is when an
attorney acts as a participant as distinguished from his traditional role of
counselor in a scheme to defraud investors, that he is bound to withdraw from
57. 283 F. Supp. at 690 (emphasis added).
58. Texas Note at 1265.
59. Karmel at 1156.
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the case and to inform the investors and the SEC of his withdrawal.60 To
claim the attorney-client privilege under these circumstances would be
to use it as a sword rather than a shield. Moreover, it is difficult for one
to disagree with the purpose of the SEC which was stated by former SEC
Commissioner Needham: "What we're saying is that in the securities area
we have always relied on the Bar and feel they have a special responsibility
in the securities area, just as acountants and other professionals do." 61
Yet one cannot help but consider the inherent questions involved in such
a reliance on the bar. This particular case is easy to accept, in that the at-
torneys actually participated in the fraudulent scheme by allowing the in-
vestor to rely upon their legal opinions. But, according to the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility,62 participation is not necessary in the crime-
fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege. All that is required is that
the lawyer receive information that his client, in the course of the represen-
tation, has perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal. Under this rea-
soning certain variations of the NSMC case could present difficult ques-
tions for the practicing lawyer. Suppose that the attorneys in the NSMC
case had learned about the misleading financial statements after the "fa-
vorable opinion" had been issued and the merger consummated. Would
they then have a duty to inform the SEC or be liable for a 10b-5 violation?63
Suppose that the attorneys had not lent their name to the merger agree-
ment, but rather, in helping the corporation to prepare the monthly reports
to the SEC, the attorneys suspected that the corporation had used misleading
information in securing approval of an upcoming merger. Would the fact
that they continued to advise their clients constitute aiding and abetting a
10b-5 violation? Another interesting aspect of the SEC's theory is its ap-
plicability to other regulatory agencies. Suppose that the attorneys sus-
60. Supra note 4, at 3, cols. 6, 7.
61. N.Y.L.J., March 6, 1972, at 1, col. 3. In a recent release, the SEC announced
that it was considering another method of enforcing the special responsibility which it
believes is required of professionals in the securities area. In Release No. 10296,
dated July 25, 1973, the Commission said that it is considering requiring the dis-
closure by public corporations in their filings with the Commission of certain legal
proceedings or disciplinary actions involving their independent accountants, outside
law firms or other professionals doing work for them. The SEC noted that severaljudicial proceedings have been instituted recently which include allegations that the
failure of issuers to disclose litigation involving accounting firms in proxy state-
ments subject to the Commission's Proxy Rules resulted in omissions of material
facts. The Commission invited interested persons to submit information and com-
ments on the proposed rule.
62. Supra note 36.
63. In Fischer v. Kletz, supra note 16, the court determined that accountants may
be obligated under Rule lOb-5 to disclose misrepresentations in financial reports which
they learned about after they had honestly and carefully audited the financial status of
a corporation.
[Vol. 23:122
1973] Securities Bar 137
pected that the merger agreement would constitute an antitrust violation,
and although they advised their clients of this, the client continues with it
anyway. Would they have any obligation to either the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission? In each of these
situations would the attorneys' obligation be to simply withdraw from repre-
senting the corporation, or to inform the SEC (or the FTC) of their with-
drawal and the reason for it? It is questions such as these that have made
the NSMC complaint the best read document since "Gone With The Wind."
Peter Chepucavage
